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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches
Martha T McCluskey,* Frank Pasquale** & Jennifer Taub***
INTRODUCTION
With a new project entitled Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches,
we hope to liberate casebook examples of economic analysis of law from their
current cramped confines. While law and economics associations increasingly
feature empirical work in their annual conferences, casebooks in property, torts,
contracts, and other core legal subjects all too often feature simple models of
economic activity developed decades ago.' While new ways of thinking about
finance, health care, and privacy have developed rapidly in the past few decades
(and particularly after the global financial crisis of 2008), casebooks all too often
rely on simple models of market-driven supply and demand, out of touch with
current economic realities.
This forthcoming casebook will address the shortcomings of the vision of
law and economics familiar in dominant instructional materials, which took
root in legal education in the 1970s. In 1995, Yale Law School Dean Anthony
Kronman noted that law and economics was the "single most influential juris-
prudential school in this country."' In the decades since, it has remained not
* Martha T. McCluskey is a Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty
Scholar at the University of Buffalo, State University of New York Law School; J.D.
Yale Law School, and J.S.D. Columbia Law School.
** Frank Pasquale is a Professor of Law at the University of Maryland, Francis King
Carey School of Law; J.D. Yale Law School, B.A. Harvard University, and M.Phil.
Oxford.
Jennifer Taub is a Professor of Law at Vermont Law School; J.D. Harvard Law
School and B.A. Yale University.
1. For an example of the diversity of work now presented at the American Law and
Economics Association, see Annual Meeting, AM. L. & ECON. Ass'N, http://www
.amlecon.org/alea-meeting.html [http://perma.cc/PHN8-Q6KA]. See also Other
Law & Economics Associations, AM. L. & ECON. Ass'N, http://www.amlecon.org/alea
-otherAssociations.html [http://perma.ccd7C7E-5ZA6].
2. Anthony T. Kronman, Remarks at the Second Driker Forum for Excellence in Law,
42 WAYNE L. REV. 115, 160 (1995). For ease of reference, for the rest of this Essay, we
characterize the potted models and simple accounts of economic life so common
in law school casebooks as "law and economics." Given the diversity of compelling
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only dominant, but also especially powerful in its influence on the teaching of
private law topics. For nearly a half century, law students have been taught that
narrow and abstract modeling is the hallmark of rigorous economic analysis of
legal scenarios.
The law and economics so influential in law school casebooks is particularly
powerful because it so often reduces the search for the optimal legal rule to a
quest for efficiency.' The concept of efficiency is, by and large, narrow: wealth
maximization. 4 As leading proponent Richard Posner explained several decades
ago, wealth maximization "refers to weighting preferences for the things that
people want, either by willingness to pay for a thing, if you do not own it, or by
unwillingness to part with it voluntarily, if you do own it."' From this ground,
making law "efficient" means taking most existing legal and economic privileg-
es, constraints, and inequalities as given, and focusing law on increasing wealth
regardless of who gets it, how they get it, or what they do with it. More recent
versions of the efficiency goal often use the term "economic welfare" instead of
"wealth" to represent the individualized gain that law should maximize,6 but
that ideal remains similarly narrow and misleading. The persistent message is
that law can and should be guided by an economic goal of maximizing an ab-
stract aggregate "pie," closing off scrutiny of the quality, content, and distribu-
tion of that pie. If law makes a presumed sum of existing individual preferences
bigger, it can be "efficient," without analysis of whether that maximized "pie" is
and creative economic analysis of law now extant (including many works by our
contributors), we do not intend to offer a blanket indictment of law and econom-
ics in general. However, we are deeply concerned that the most prevalent and
popularized forms of law and economics are misleading students.
3. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarify-
ing the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 821, 834 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669
(1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rule-
making: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71
AM. EcoN. REV. 414, 417 (1981) (arguing that legal rules should focus primarily on
efficiency, leaving other concerns like equality to the political process via possible
taxation and transfers, without regard to how unequal or destructive economic
wealth actually can impede such political "redistribution").
4. Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the Common Law, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 775, 778 (1981).
5. Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 85, 86 (1987).
6. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REv.
961, 977-78 (2001) (arguing that public policy should be "assessed exclusively" on
the basis of aggregate individual gain in well-being from an existing baseline).
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actually toxic or temporary or totally controlled by the top one-tenth of one
percent of wealth holders.7
In a 2014 essay, Harvard Law student Ted Hamilton reflected that the "most
repeated word in my first year curriculum was not justice, or liberty, or order. It
was efficiency."' As Hamilton explains, this term continues to reduce law to the
goal of maximizing economic gain without evaluating that gain, so that law stu-
dents are taught that efficiency means wealth maximization, and students learn
to treat legal questions as objective problems of counting divorced from com-
plex social, moral, and political analysis. Some empirical research confirms that
this emphasis on efficiency can affect students' views.9
This understanding of economics in law is partial, in two ways. It is incom-
plete, largely ignoring new economic issues and theory, such as the excellent
work done by Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) fellows. And it is
often biased, privileging the perspectives of the most powerful actors in the
economy by presenting legal rules favoring these interests as uncontestable eco-
nomic truth.
Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches will address the shortcom-
ings of law and economics by examining its fundamental theories, methods,
and failures."o In chapters on specific legal topics, we use examples of current
issues in judicial decisions, statutes, regulations, or policy debates as the basis
for showing the gaps in conventional economic analysis and the potential con-
tributions of more complete and clear thinking. We will make a more robust
economic analysis accessible to non-specialists by showing how economic anal-
ysis of law inevitably depends on and draws from other disciplines, and relies
7. See Martha T. McCluskey, Personal Responsibility for Systemic Inequality, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE LAW 244-45 (Ugo Mattei &
John D. Haskell eds., 2015) (explaining how framing legal analysis in terms of max-
imizing or equalizing individualized choice under naturalized scarcity denies law's
power to create better choices by changing systemic political economic inequalities
and destructiveness).
8. Ted Hamilton, Why Law School's Love Affair with Economics Is Terrible for the
American Legal System, SALON (July 26, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/
2014/07/26/whylaw_schoolsloveaffair with economicsneedsto-stop/
[http://perma.cc/USEU-HSBL].
9. See, e.g., Raymond Fisman et al., The Distributional Preferences of an Elite, 349
SCIENCE 1300, 1300 (2015) (noting that Yale Law School "subjects were substantially
more efficiency-focused than were the ... subjects drawn from the general popula-
tion.... The YLS subjects displayed this distinctive preference for efficiency over
equality in spite of overwhelmingly (by more than io to 1) self-identifying as Dem-
ocrats").
io. We follow in the footsteps of leading scholarly critiques of law and economics. See,
e.g., EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE,
GENDER, IDENTITY, AND ECONOMICS 233, 323 (2005) (discussing internal and exter-
nal critiques of "classic market theory").
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on assumptions about facts and values that are not the subject of distinctively
economic expertise.
The topics covered will include health law, international trade, labor law,
minimum wage policy, civil rights, unemployment policy, securities laws, and
financial regulation. The chapters offer new understandings of the assumptions,
contingencies, and omissions that complicate legal applications of standard
economic principles like supply and demand, comparative advantage in trade
policy, externalities, or the distinction between market and state.
To move beyond existing misconceptions and oversimplifications, our
casebook chapters draw on methodologically diverse approaches to economics,
integrating the best of historical, anthropological, and sociological approaches
with a new emphasis on macroeconomics. This approach aims to correct the
methodological individualism and lack of context characteristic of traditional
law and economics. Legal experts' narrow focus on microeconomics contribut-
ed to the recent financial crisis by reinforcing faith in the capacity of markets to
reach optimal outcomes without strong regulatory oversight. Such misplaced
faith highlights the need for a new economic analysis of law that is responsive to
theories of macroeconomic conditions and financial instability.
In addition, these new approaches to law and economics will include more
diverse and sophisticated understandings of law, including legal realism's un-
derstanding that economic conditions shape how law is implemented and en-
forced. As Columbia Law Professor Katharina Pistor's recent scholarship on law
and finance adeptly demonstrates, law and markets are co-constitutive." Just as
law depends on economics, economics cannot provide a simple and unidirec-
tional expertise in "market forces" to legal scholars and policymakers because
these economic forces are at least in part a matter of law. If preferences are en-
dogenous, and dependent upon legal rights, then the criterion of allocative effi-
ciency" cannot determine a uniquely optimal set of legal rules. Additional nor-
mative criteria must be employed. Similarly, insights from behavioral
economics have revealed the ways in which so-called "social preferences" may
be crowded out by legal incentives. If this is the case, then the law cannot mere-
ly and simply respond to a pre-existing homo economicus; it may, additionally,
be responsible for shaping it.
I. CHANGING THE FRAME
Why transform economic analysis of law, rather than reject it altogether?
Because we need more, not fewer, accounts of how law can improve economic
justice and economic policy. A central barrier to that goal is precisely the idea
that rigorous economics stands fundamentally apart and disengaged from mo-
i. Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory ofFinance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315 (2013).
12. DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 19 (2014) (explaining how a
dynamic, macro-level, legal economic analysis improves on the standard allocative
efficiency, which focuses economics on calculating the microeconomic costs and
benefits of transactions).
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rality, politics, and social or historical context. By deepening and broadening
law's economics, we aim to free contemporary theory and policy from one of its
most insidious and confining interpretive frames.
We need not cede the goal of economic prosperity to those who insist on a
narrow or failed conception of economic well-being and of how to achieve that
goal. Our casebook will move beyond the familiar division between policies
aimed at fairness, democracy, equality, and environmental sustainability on the
one hand and policies aimed at wealth maximization on the other. Though this
divided frame appears neutral on the surface, permitting a choice to favor the
supposedly non-economic goals, conventional law and economics teaches that
rejecting economic efficiency in favor of other goals often risks producing a
smaller economic pie, making those alternative goals less attainable. 3 The
choice of moral and social goals therefore appears subjective and naive in con-
trast to the seemingly more scientific economic goals of wealth maximization or
allocative efficiency.
Our casebook shifts the frame to question the assumption of natural trade-
offs between equity and efficiency. Scholars and practitioners would benefit
from understanding the economic debates about the assumptions and implica-
tions of standard ideas of allocative efficiency. By recognizing that economics
includes different theories and methods, predicated on particular, debatable
moral and social judgments, discussions of economics in law can better exam-
ine social justice concerns. With a contemporary curriculum that explores the
imperfect empirical information and contested values involved in determining
both efficiency and equity, the question becomes not whether to include nor-
mative analysis but rather how to more rigorously and openly evaluate compet-
ing perspectives, including whether efficiency should be the central goal in eco-
nomics or law.
The current political context underscores the dangers of leaving in place a
law and economics inadequate for the challenges of our time. In a prevailing
law and economics framework that defines economic rationality as essentially
unconcerned with fairness and inequality, proposals to advance economic jus-
tice can appear presumptively irrational and unrealistic, closing off the possibil-
ities for beneficial reform. Further, when law's dominant economic rationality
appears to bring substantial injustice, instability, and despair for many, this
framework appears to offer little alternative for reform other than a politics dis-
dainful of both law and rationality. 4 Instead, this casebook shows the possibili-
ties for more rationally engaging law's potential for greater economic justice.
13. See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neolib-
eral Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 805-o6 (2003) (explaining how a
skewed ideal of efficiency is used to create a double bind for policies promoting
economic equality).
14. See Jayati Ghosh, The Economics of Political Change in Developed Countries, TRIPLE
CRISIS BLOG (Aug. 4, 2016), http://triplecrisis.com/the-economics-of-political-
change-in-developed-countries/ [http://perma.cc/N878-2TG6] (linking destructive
politics of anger and racism across the United States and much of Europe to the
301
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
II. TOWARD A SCHOLARLY AND INCLUSIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS CASEBOOK
Law schools offer law and economics in standalone courses as well as in
classes on particular subject areas, including both foundational classes in torts,
property, and contracts, and in elective upper-level courses in specialties such as
health law, environmental law, corporate law, and regulatory policy. Law and
economics is also taught outside of law schools to students in other disciplines,
including management, public policy, and economics. The case method re-
mains the dominant pedagogical tool for teaching law. Typically, casebooks
compile judicial opinions from which students extract the "rule" of law in order
to predict and evaluate rules governing future controversies and new situations.
Casebook authors offer commentary and questions between cases to illu-
minate the normative claims and policy considerations underlying and guiding
the developing law. Across numerous areas of law, whether in judge-made
common law, statutory and regulatory law, or constitutional law, this commen-
tary often highlights conventional economic analysis-focused on efficiency
goals-as a primary guide to evaluating law. Casebooks are enormously influ-
ential in shaping thinking about law and in promoting new legal approaches
and new subject areas. The casebook lesson that economic efficiency is a central
(and objective) measure for law has become especially influential in legal rea-
soning outside the classroom. For example, in 2011 the D.C. Circuit struck
down the first Dodd-Frank rulemaking, which would have granted shareholders
the power to include their director nominees on the official corporate ballot.
The court reasoned that stringent quantitative cost-benefit analysis must guide
the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulatory policy, even when not re-
quired by statute.15 Yet, reflecting a more contemporary approach, the same
court rejected using cost-benefit analysis based in dollars as a means to dismiss
human rights concerns."
We believe contemporary approaches reject the mistaken emphasis on a
narrow conception of efficiency that reflects problematic assumptions about the
nature and scope of economic reasoning. We are developing Law and Econom-
ics: Contemporary Approaches to invite these approaches and introduce them to
scholars and students. This casebook could be used as a complete volume or in
chapter form, with some modules free of charge through a website sponsored
failure of political leaders to offer major economic change in response to deep
economic dissatisfaction).
15. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("We agree with the
petitioners and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having
failed once again ... adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule." (in-
ternal citations omitted)).
16. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rehearing en banc)
("Even if one could estimate how many lives are saved or rapes prevented as a di-
rect result of the final rule, doing so would be pointless because the costs of the
rule-measured in dollars-would create an apples-to-bricks comparison.").
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by the Association for the Promotion of Political Economy and Law." This
casebook and a companion website could be the focal point for developing a
community of teachers, professionals, and scholars engaged in advancing new
approaches to law and economics in their teaching, research, and professional
practice. Production of a companion website will help promote teaching the
book, with a syllabus bank, resource bibliography, and forum for further ex-
change of ideas. Collaborative work on the book and related materials will in-
clude two workshops each year bringing together lead authors with selected ex-
perts who will participate in developing modules on specialized subtopics, such
as environmental law. In addition, these workshops will include several invited
faculty interested in developing new courses based on the casebook, to get their
input as well as to build excitement and expertise among a larger group of law
and economics teachers.
While Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches will be inclusive, its
contributions will focus on a common set of questions, including:
(1) Markets and Law
(a) What appears to be a "market force" in judicial reasoning?
(b) How does a more extensive analysis reveal the underlying socio-legal
institutions and rules and practices driving that "market" dynamic?
(c) What interests and ideas ground these particular institutions and how
might alternatives create different, perhaps better markets-and better
for whom?
(2) Efficiency and Redistribution
(a) In leading cases and regulations, what assumptions about "efficiency"
are being made-what kinds of gains, for whom, are being identified as
the public good, and how do these assumptions compare to alternative
ways of understanding the public good? Who is bearing the risks? Who
is getting the rewards of these asserted gains?
(b) How do we decide what laws, institutions, and transactions constitute
"normal" or freely chosen mutually beneficial distribution versus "re-
distribution"? If law is designed to prioritize the goal of some kind of
economic gain separate from consideration of equitable distribution or
17. As co-founders of an organization called the Association for the Promotion of Po-
litical Economy and the Law (APPEAL), our team has been working for several
years to build connections between law and new economic thinking. This organi-
zation developed in part out of a 2010 SUNY Buffalo Law School event. We have
organized a series of informal meetings between law scholars and heterodox econ-
omists along with several conference panel presentations, all of which set the
foundation for our first major conference in May 2014, Critiquing Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Financial Regulation, in Washington, D.C. We have sponsored two
other networks and events: an Education Finance Research Group, which con-
vened in 2015 to consider the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, and a
workshop on the topic of a new law and economics casebook.
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social values (like environmental well-being), on the theory that eco-
nomic gain will then mean greater resources for these "non-economic"
goals, what may stand in the way of that "redistribution"?
(3) Incentive Effects and Market Failures
(a) Analyzing incentive effects and the unintended consequences of law in
action is an important contribution of economic analysis. How can we
better understand these complex causal effects by adding insights and
methods from other disciplines (e.g., sociology, political theory, an-
thropology, and history) to the basic formal principles of neoclassical
economics?
(b) Neoclassical economics assumes market incentives produce the opti-
mal public good through free choice via price mechanisms. When are
the incentives created by existing price structures the result of market
failures that instead will make society worse off?
(c) The standard neoliberal response to "market failure" analysis is that
whatever the limits of "markets," similar or worse complexities and
failures mean government is likely to do even worse at providing the
optimal incentives. But what government regulatory protections and
penalties drive the supposed "market" incentives that are being pre-
sented as the alternative to government regulation? How might we re-
frame the debate as a choice between differently regulated markets, dif-
ferently distributing the risks and rewards of bad information and
other failures? Might new work on capture, such as Carpenter and
Moss's collection, titled Preventing Regulatory Capture," answer public
choice concerns about regulatory failures?
(4) Costs and Benefits
(a) Carefully weighing alternatives is another potential contribution of
economic analysis of law, taking into account foregone opportunities
and long-term complex consequences. How might that careful analysis
be undermined by false simplistic precision from quantification of the
effects of legal rules?
(b) How do we analyze less quantifiable goods?
(c) How does this analysis take into account the risk of catastrophe (e.g.,
climate change, war)? The costs of inequality?
(d) How might scenario analysis or other methods improve our under-
standing of the value of highly uncertain losses or gains?
(5) Austerity and Scarcity
(a) Neoclassical economic analysis focuses on making tradeoffs under
scarcity. For any given legal question, what assumptions are being
made about the assumed scarcity that limits the possibilities for law to
18. PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND How To
LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013).
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pursue equality and fairness or environmental well-being as one exam-
ple? How does the "price" of a given option reflect law and politics as
well as natural scarcity?
(b) How might the insights of Modern Monetary Theory change assump-
tions about austerity and tradeoffs in government spending?
III. DEVELOPING THE THEMES: CHAPTER PREVIEWS
For a summary example of how our Law and Economics: Contemporary Ap-
proaches will develop these themes, a chapter by Martha T. McCluskey and
Mark Silverman focuses on the current policy debate about raising the mini-
mum wage. The chapter examines comments by a leading economist, Greg
Mankiw, on how the basic principle of supply and demand limits efforts to help
low-wage workers by raising their wages. 9 That comment presents the familiar
neoclassical economic argument that higher minimum wages are likely to mean
fewer jobs for low-wage workers. McCluskey and Silverman offer notes and
questions drawing on empirical data, closer analysis of legal context, and in-
sights from a broader range of economic theory to question the assumptions
and reliability of this standard idea of a tough policy tradeoff between higher
wages and more employment.
One theme the chapter illuminates is how the standard theory fails to rec-
ognize the deep interrelationship between law and economics. If employers in
some conditions respond to higher mandated wage minimums by cutting low-
wage employment, that response reflects particular, contested, and changeable
conditions of law rather than the general or inevitable force of economics. For
example, specific laws shape the institutional obligations and interests of busi-
ness organizations with regard to their workers, customers, and communities,
and laws shape employers' costs, risks, and rewards of adjusting to higher labor
costs with strategies other than reduced employment. A second theme the chap-
ter illuminates is how the standard theory's abstraction misses crucial aspects of
the context of labor, such as the fact that the nature of the "commodity"-
workers' labor-is likely to change with price, so that as wages rise above pov-
erty levels, workers are likely to be more productive, both in individual firms
(due to higher retention and morale)2 0 and taking into consideration the mac-
roeconomic impact (increased consumer spending).
19. See, e.g., Greg Mankiw, Living Wage Redux, GREG MANKIw'S BLOG (May 7, 2007),
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2007/05/living-wage-redux.html [http://perma
.ccl7XXC-LZSX] (criticizing arguments for a living wage on the ground that "[i]t
is a timeless economic lesson that when the price of something goes up, buyers
usually buy less of it").
20. See John Schmitt, Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Em-
ployment?, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL'Y RES. 2-11 (2013), http://cepr.net/documents/
publications/min-wage-2o13-o2.pdf [http://perma.cc/YGD5-2SEE] (reviewing the
numerous empirical studies of the effect of raising the minimum wage in the peri-
od since 2000).
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In a third turn from the standard analysis, the chapter uses empirical data
and closer analysis to probe the value judgments obscured in the argument that
higher minimum wages means higher low-wage unemployment. That argu-
ment rests on narrowing what counts as unemployment to exclude the rising
numbers of U.S. low-wage workers who have dropped out of the workforce as
the costs of maintaining work have outpaced basic living costs, leading to more
non-elderly adults with poor health at risk of turning to drug addiction and sui-
cide in place of work, family care, and education." In short, the chapter ex-
plains how a nuanced and complete consideration of the interaction of law and
economics does not support a simple or inevitable tradeoff between higher
wages and lower employment for low-wage workers, and how minimum wage
policies might be designed to avoid the risk of offsetting job losses.
Frank Pasquale's chapter on health insurance law and policy questions sev-
eral premises of the economic analysis that is a staple of current health law
casebooks. For neoclassical economists, pervasive regulation is the original sin
of the U.S. health care system-a deviation from the market forces that are
supposed to promote competition, discipline spending, and increase quality.
For neoclassicals, the private insurance market is a kind of penance designed to
bring market discipline to a field they view as coddled by government interven-
tion. Patients may not be able to strike bargains well on their own, but insurers
are supposed to act as their agents, negotiating for the best combination of cost
and quality in care. However, private insurers are primarily responsible to their
own shareholders and bondholders, secondarily to the firm that hires them (in
the case of employer-sponsored insurance), and only via contract to the insured
patient. These divided loyalties complicate usual assumptions about the private
insurers' potential to protect the interests of the insured. Pasquale's chapter re-
jects the usual, consumer-oriented presentation of health insurance choices and
risks as an ordinary business transaction, presenting instead the complex condi-
tions that make fully informed, arms-length bargaining impossible.2
For the architects of the Affordable Care Act, 3 health insurance should be
like mainstream consumer goods-offered on an internet-driven marketplace,
with sufficient choice to enable consumers to expertly weigh their preferences
21. See The Long-Term Decline in Prime-Age Male Labor Force Participation, WHITE
HOUSE COUNCIL ECON. ADVISERS 2, 4 (2016), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/page/files/201662o-cea-primeage-malelfp.pdf [http://perma.cc/
WJ9W-QB9R].
22. See also Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 687
(2013) (identifying a "distinct field of health care economics" as a vital comple-
ment to ordinary economic reasoning in health settings); Frank Pasquale, Access to
Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 269, 287 (2010) (ex-
plaining how application of neoliberal austerity policies to reduce funding for do-
mestic graduate medical education led to immigration of physicians trained in
less-developed countries, creating shortages of medical personnel in less-
developed countries that were unaccounted for in neoliberal economic theory).
23. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18ool et seq. (2012).
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for containing costs, and gaining access to a large network of physicians and
convenient, reputable firms. But this model fails on many levels. A consumer
can anticipate roughly how many miles she will drive a car over the next year-
but has no idea if she will get in a car accident requiring intensive care. Nor in
many cases is it possible to find out well in advance what various health out-
comes will cost. Instead, consumers are predictably defaulting toward the low-
est cost plans-which, in turn, are keeping costs low by contracting with re-
stricted, narrow networks of physicians. Those narrow networks assure that
many are stuck with surprise medical bills-a patient can easily be treated by
"out-of-network" doctors in an "in-network" emergency room. The founda-
tional mistake-of viewing health care as, more or less, a consumer market-
has resulted in financial ruin for many families (who find "out of network" care
uncovered)24 and widespread public anger at "Obamacare's" failure to stop
what strikes many as a bait and switch operation." Pasquale's chapter also ex-
amines the proposed legal fixes for these problems and the epicycles of regula-
tion and re-regulation necessary to a neoliberal model of health "consumers"
which bears as much resemblance to reality as Ptolemy's geocentric model of
the solar system did.26
In another chapter, Radl Carrillo and Pavlina Tcherneva expand the analy-
sis of unemployment policy further beyond private micro-level decisions of
employers and workers to recognize the deeper ways in which law and govern-
ment actively produce unemployment through the design of public law-
including constitutional law, administrative law, and legislation. This shift in
understanding provides legal and economic support for policies that would in-
stead promote full employment, such as a right to work. In a chapter that also
24. Mark Hall et al., Solving Surprise Medical Bills, BROOKINGS (Oct. 13, 2016),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/solving-surprise-medical-bills/ [http://perma
.cc/PH9Z-GKR7].
25. Mark Blumenthal & Jonathan Cohn, The Surprising Reason So Many People Still
Don't Like Obamacare, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2015, 8:03 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2015/o6/21/obamacare-approval-polls n_7632070.html
[http://perma.cc/KE3T-4974].
26. An epicycle was an adjustment in orbit added to Ptolemaic models of the move-
ment of the stars and planets. The geocentric system "worked" for many predic-
tions as long as such ad hoc adjustments were made. See THOMAS KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 68 (1962) ("Given a particular discrepancy,
[medieval] astronomers were invariably able to eliminate it by making some par-
ticular adjustment in Ptolemy's system of compounded circles. But as time went
on, a man looking at the net result of the normal research effort of many astrono-
mers could observe that astronomy's complexity was increasing far more rapidly
than its accuracy and that a discrepancy corrected in one place was likely to show
up in another."). The complexity of the resulting systems is analogous to the com-
plexity of many policy ideas in health care, where complicated regulations prolif-
erate as federal and state officials try to square circles and plug loopholes devel-
oped by attorneys far better compensated than them.
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shifts the ground of law and economics beyond individualized transactions,
Kenneth Casebeer leads readers through cases showing how the seemingly eco-
nomic forces producing inequality and insecurity are driven by a fictional and
skewed separation between state and market in constitutional law. Casebeer
identifies possibilities and challenges for developing an economic rationality in
law grounded in a deeper analysis of social interdependence and institutions to
better advance human flourishing.
CONCLUSION
So-called "market forces" are thoroughly intertwined with law and cannot
be understood without some reference to history, sociology, psychology, and
other social sciences. Economics Nobel Laureates like Robert Shiner and Elinor
Ostrom have recognized the productive ecology of social sciences." It is time
for legal scholars to develop a law and economics curriculum that catches up
with the advances of economics as a discipline.
The urgent challenges of the twenty-first century also call for a new law and
economics. Solutions to problems such as rising inequality, climate change, de-
industrialization, automation, infrastructural decline, underdevelopment, and
financial instability will depend on deepened understandings of how economics
is interrelated with complex legal rules and legal institutions. Lawyers with a
more advanced and nuanced understanding of economics will be far better
poised to help solve these problems than those lulled into thinking that simple
neoclassicism reflects all that economics can offer to law.
27. See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE
ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION (2015) (analyzing how, without
strong regulation, markets systematically undermine the greater good by using de-
ception and unequal information to exploit human vulnerabilities); ELINOR
OLSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (analyzing diverse examples of successful cooperative
control of economic resources, refuting and complicating assumptions of the
competitive market model).
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